Abstract: In this paper I estimate the effect of the Underserved Areas Goal (UAG) established under the "GSE Act", a 1992 law mandating that the housing government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac help promote credit access and homeownership opportunities for low-income households and in low-income and minority neighborhoods. I identify the goal's impact by taking advantage of a discontinuity in the census tract eligibility rule. Employing local linear and non-parametric regression discontinuity methods, I find that this goal has had a direct effect on GSE purchasing activity of 3-4% and increases overall GSE-eligible originations by 2-3% on average at the cutoff between 1997 and 2002. Changing eligibility status following the release of Census 2000 data provides another source of variation to identify the UAG's effect in 2005 and 2006, years of sharply increasing goals levels and years which have contributed heavily to current credit losses. I find that while the UAG affected GSE behavior in 2005 and 2006, GSE risk avoidance limited their response. Unlike previous research, I find no evidence that UAG-induced increases in GSE credit supply crowds-out FHA and subprime lending. 
Introduction
Recent turmoil in the mortgage market has brought considerable attention to public policies aimed at increasing credit supply and homeownership among relatively low-income households and in lower-income and minority neighborhoods. In particular, many have raised concerns that the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which encourages bank and thrift institutions to extend credit to lower-income neighborhoods and households, and the "GSE Act", under which Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are expected to meet regulator-established mortgage purchase goals for mortgages made to lower-income and minority households and neighborhoods, have pushed regulated institutions to take excessive risk. In this paper, I test empirically whether the GSE Act has affected the behavior of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Congress established Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to connect distant borrowers and
investors, improving the efficiency of mortgage markets. Before being conserved in 2008, the two institutions operated as private "government-sponsored enterprises" (GSEs), with implicit and explicit financial benefits from the government (CBO 2001) . In return for their sponsored status, the GSEs were expected to help promote homeownership opportunities for low-income and minority households and neighborhoods. The 1992 Federal Housing Enterprise Financial Safety and Soundness Act (or GSE Act) formalizes this responsibility. The GSE Act instructs the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to create "Affordable Housing Goals" for the GSEs and monitor their progress towards those goals. These goals, adjusted periodically, specify that a certain fraction of GSE mortgage purchases should be of mortgages made to targeted households and neighborhoods.
The GSE Act is one of several local and federal government programs and mandates intended to increase credit access and homeownership. One factor motivating these policies are sociological and economic theories suggesting that credit access and homeownership generate positive externalities such as reduced crime, improved child outcomes, increased investment in local public goods and increased voter turnout 1 .
These policies have also been motivated as ways to help overcome apparent market failures such as racial discrimination (e.g. Munnell et al 1996) . Another often cited market imperfection is that some of the information lenders use to price mortgages is a public good and so there may be underinvestment in information by lenders resulting in suboptimal credit supply (Lang and Nakamura 1993) . Lang and Nakamura argue, for instance, that a positive shock to credit supply that increases neighborhood home sales may generate public information about local home values that leads to a higher level of credit supply in equilibrium. Bhutta (2008) provides some evidence for this hypothesis, finding that the CRA pushes regulated lenders to increase their lending in targeted lower-income neighborhoods, which in turn leads to an increase in lending by unregulated lenders in some targeted neighborhoods -specifically, those neighborhoods that have had relatively low loan volume in the recent past, consistent with an information spillover story.
Several studies have documented positive trends in GSE purchases of loans from targeted groups over time. Figure 1 shows how the three affordable housing goals created by HUD have changed over time and each of the GSEs' corresponding purchase shares over time. 2 The initial goals (thick black line) were finalized in December 1995, then were increased in 1997 and then again in 2001, 2005 and 2006 . Numbers generated from analyses by Manchester (2002 Manchester ( , 2008 of GSE data are also shown in Figure 1 and suggest that the GSEs have been raising their share of purchases towards the target populations.
However, Figure 1 does not indicate whether the affordable housing goals have actually forced the GSEs to behave differently than they would in the absence of the Act. In this paper, I
use comprehensive mortgage application data collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) and test whether the Underserved Areas Goal (top panel of Figure 1 ), which targets relatively low-income neighborhoods, has had a causal impact on GSE purchase activity and subsequent mortgage credit flow in targeted neighborhoods. Under this goal, a purchased loan counts towards the GSEs' goal if the loan is for an owner-occupied property in a census tract that has a median family income less than or equal to 90% of the MSA median family income. 3 I exploit this discontinuity in the selection rule to identify the impact of the housing goal, in essence comparing GSE purchase volume and overall loan volume in tracts just below the 90% cutoff to that in tracts just above the cutoff. More precisely, I employ local nonparametric and 2 See notes underneath Figure 1 for description of GSE housing goals 3 The Underserved Areas goal also targets low and moderate income, predominantly minority neighborhoods: census tracts where minorities make up at least 30% of the population and median family income is no greater 120% of the MSA median family income. Ongoing research by the author exploits this discontinuity as well as the discontinuity in the other two Affordable Housing Goals to more thoroughly evaluate the GSE Act's impact.
semi-parametric regression discontinuity methods similar to those described in Porter (2003) and Imbens and Lemieux (2008) .
Discerning the causal effect of the GSE goals on GSE behavior and overall credit flow is important for several reasons. First, in order to prevent future catastrophes it is crucial to have a clear understanding of the factors contributing to the current one. For example, falsely attributing the GSEs' collapse to their affordable housing responsibilities might lead policy makers to ignore other, more important determinants of the GSEs' failure.
Policy makers should also be interested in whether increased GSE purchasing activity ultimately affects the mortgage supply -whether, in fact, the GSEs can be used to achieve social policy ends. One reason the affordable housing goals would have little or no impact is if increased GSE purchase activity in targeted census tracts crowded out non-GSE purchasers.
Another reason, proposed by An and Bostic (2008, 2006) , is that the increased supply of GSE funds in targeted neighborhoods may draw the highest quality FHA and subprime applicants into conventional, conforming loans (still, a boon to consumer welfare, the authors note).
Finally, identifying and quantifying the GSE Act's effects can provide insight into the role the Act played, as opposed to market forces and other public policies, in the surge in homeownership and household mortgage debt since the mid-1990's. While the homeownership rate and household mortgage debt grew sharply in the years following passage of the GSE Act, a number of other policy, regulatory and (supply side) market changes could have driven these trends as well (Li 2005) . From the late 1980's to mid 1990's, Congress strengthened HMDA, helping regulators and consumer advocates detect discrimination by mortgage lenders, as well as the CRA. At the same time, information technology improvements greatly reduced the cost of mortgage lending during the 1990's and improved the ability of mortgage lenders to price risk, which is important for subprime lending (see Straka 2000) .
Only a few papers test for causal effects of the GSE Act. Ambrose and Thibodeau (2003) try to estimate the impact of the GSE Act on credit supply using a credit supply-demand model that assumes price increases indicate excess demand (loan volume is on the supply curve) and vice versa. They conclude that the GSE Act has had little impact based on their finding that there is only a small (positive) relationship between MSA loan volume and the MSA population share living in GSE targeted census tracts. However, it is possible that their results are biased downward as this regressor is likely negatively correlated with many MSA-level socio-economic characteristics that predict mortgage volume.
4 Bostic and Gabriel (2006) estimate the impact of being a GSE-targeted census tract on tract housing outcomes (e.g. median home value) in California using the 2000 Census. Similar to the identification strategy in this paper, they take advantage of the discontinuous eligibility rule, comparing outcomes for tracts within ten percentage points below the cutoff to those within the same distance above the cutoff. 5 They do not find evidence of a treatment effect, but the interval they use is large and they do not control for the "assignment variable" (i.e. tract to MSA median family income ratio). As the results in this paper will show, such a strategy can lead to severe bias despite controlling for many other covariates.
Finally, An and Bostic (2008, 2006) test whether increased GSE activity in targeted tracts crowds out FHA and subprime lending, motivating their study as an exploration of one reason
the GSE Act appears to have had a limited impact on real outcomes as in Bostic and Gabriel above. In these two papers, their outcomes of interest are the change (between 1996 and 2000) in FHA and subprime shares of total tract originations, respectively. They regress these variables on the change in GSE share of originations. 6 Further, they propose instrumenting this regressor with a variable indicating for being a GSE-targeted census tract. Similar to Bostic and Gabriel's study described above, An and Bostic's main regressions use tracts within ten percentage points of the 90% cutoff, and again they do not control for the assignment variable.
An and Bostic find statistically significant negative second-stage relationships between GSE share and the two outcome variables. But since they fail to find a first stage relationship, these results likely represent the equilibrium cross-sectional relationship one would expect -that tracts with more conforming, prime loans purchased by the GSEs will tend to have fewer subprime loans.
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Regardless of these potential shortcomings, analyzing loan shares may generate misleading results as well. Take for example (1.1) below, which regresses tract-level FHA loan share on tract-level GSE-purchased loan share (a la An and Bostic, 2008) :
Instrumenting the GSE-purchase share variable with a treatment dummy is not valid since the treatment may affect GSE-Eligible (indeed, the ultimate goal of the Act is to increase overall credit flow), which enters in the dependent variable. As such one cannot interpret a negative estimate of β as evidence that FHA lending falls in response to increased GSE purchase activity as An and Bostic do.
In contrast to An and Bostic, I estimate separately the impact of the Underserved Areas Goal (UAG) of the GSE Act on (1) the number of GSE purchases, (2) the total number of GSE- the GSEs met increasing goal levels and also years contributing heavily to current credit losses.
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To preview, I find evidence of a direct effect of the UAG on GSE purchasing activity and "GSE-eligible" originations, but of modest magnitude (3-4% and 2-3%, respectively). At the same time, I find no evidence of a reduction in "GSE-ineligible" lending, which is comprised mainly of FHA and subprime loans (see Section 2.2).
These results are similar for different bandwidths and control function specifications. I also find that the relationship between GSE-eligible loan volume and the assignment variable (conditional on covariates) is generally smooth -that is, I find almost no other discontinuities at points away from the cutoff. However, the results for GSE purchases and GSE-eligible lending just mentioned are conditional on tract-level covariates, including a lagged ("pre-treatment") 
Data & Empirical Strategy

Overview
I take advantage of a sharp discontinuity in the UAG eligibility rule to identify the goal's impact on GSE purchase volume and overall credit flow between. Again, GSE purchases of mortgages for owner-occupied properties in census tracts with a median family income no greater than 90% of MSA median family income count towards meeting the UAG. In the regression discontinuity (RD) analysis that follows, this ratio of tract median family income to MSA median family income is the "assignment" (or "running") variable and will be referred to as TM. Thus, census tracts with TM ≤ 0.90 are targeted by the GSEs and the impact of the UAG at the cutoff will be identified by measuring the jump in purchase and loan volume at TM = 0.90. which necessitates a separate study of the GSE Act using HMDA data in years after 2002.
Some outlier census tracts were dropped as well. Those with fewer than 100 housing units, those with zero "specified" owner-occupied units, those with more than 30% of the population living in group quarters and those with fewer than one home purchase or refinance origination per (1990) owner-occupied between 1997 and 2002 or more than ten originations per (1990) owner-occupied unit between 1997 and 2002 were dropped. In the vicinity of the GSEeligibility cutoff (i.e. the census tracts of interest for the regression discontinuity design described below), just over 97% of census tracts are retained in the sample. GSE-eligible originations are those with loan amounts within the conforming loan limit set by Congress, are conventional (i.e. not FHA or VA insured), and are not originated by a subprime lender as defined by HUD. Eligible loans account for about two-thirds of the market, while the number of eligible loans in just-targeted tracts is about 10% lower relative to just-not-targeted tracts. These figures also show that the GSEs purchase about two-thirds of the eligible loans that are purchased. About one-third of loans are not purchased in the year that they are originated. If these loans are sold in later years -called 'seasoned' loans -they will not generally be reported in HMDA. As such, HMDA does not account for all GSE purchase activity (see Scheessele 1998).
In terms of "GSE-ineligible" loans, almost none of these are purchased by the GSEs. The majority of these loans are relatively high-priced, high-risk FHA-insured and subprime loans, while the rest are VA-insured and "jumbo" loans (above the single-family conforming loan amount). The few ineligible loans purchased by the GSEs may be attributed to reporting error and to the fact that identifying eligible loans in the HMDA data is not perfect -for instance, subprime lenders may make prime loans and vice versa. 13 Interestingly, in contrast to the case for eligible loans there is no statistical difference in ineligible lending for the two groups around the cutoff.
Panel B shows tract averages of housing and demographic characteristics measured in the 1990 Census. Similar to the pattern for overall origination volume, the number of owneroccupied housing units is significantly lower in GSE-targeted tracts relative to those not targeted, but the difference (5%) is not as great as the difference in loan volume (8%). At the same time, tract-size is not substantively different across the cutoff (second row), which is not surprising since tracts are designed to be of similar size.
Most of the other housing and demographic characteristics are (statistically) significantly different across the cutoff. These results suggest that these two groups of tracts are not similar despite their being relatively near the cutoff. In other words, tract characteristics appear to change quickly with the running variable, TM. As such, it will be important to employ a strategy that will adequately control for these differences.
Empirical Strategy: Regression Discontinuity
Consider the following tract-level regression of potential outcomes such as mortgage origination volume on a treatment indicator variable,
The following expression captures the intuition behind the regression discontinuity design:
13 Overall, though, mortgage lenders tended to specialize in either prime or subprime lending during this period. (see Nichols et al 2005) . Another source of discrepancy is the fact that conforming loan limits are higher for 2, 3 and 4 unit dwellings, but the HMDA do not provide information on the number of units for 1-4 family properties.
(
(1.3) implies that GSE targeted and not-targeted tracts arbitrarily close to the cutoff (TM = 0.90) are identical in expectation with the exception of their eligibility status. As such, any substantive difference in outcomes across the cutoff for tracts 'near' the cutoff can be attributed to a GSE treatment effect.
With that in mind, a natural approach to estimating β is to simply compare the mean of Y i for tracts "just below" the cutoff to that for tracts "just above" the cutoff. This can be done in a single regression, weighting observations with kernel weights Porter (2003) shows that the bias of this nonparametric approach increases (for a given h) in the slope of the relationship between the outcome and running variables. More concretely, since mortgage activity is negatively correlated with tract income (see Table 2 ) nonparametric estimates of β from will be downward biased (i.e. against finding a positive impact of the UAG).
I try to mitigate this bias by using a small bandwidth (h = 0.02), triangular kernel weights and adding tract-level covariates into the regression, including a lagged ('pretreatment') value of the outcome variable.
Following Imbens and Lemieux (2007) , I also perform local linear regression to estimate β. This strategy allows one to use data further away from the cutoff by controlling for the slope of the relationship between the outcome and assignment variables on either side of the cutoff.
Simply stated, in this approach I fit a line to the data within a distance h on either side of the cutoff and β is calculated as the difference between the intercepts of these two estimated lines.
This will be done in a single, kernel weighted regression:
in (1.4) is often referred to as the "control function". For all regressions, robust standard errors clustered at the MSA level are reported.
Results
Testing the Identification Assumption
The RD identification assumption is that all tract characteristics affecting tract loan volume change smoothly across the cutoff except for tract eligibility status, which changes sharply at the cutoff. Although this assumption is not fully testable, one may be more confident it holds if observable, "pre-treatment" tract characteristics change smoothly across the cutoff. Figure 3 illustrates the basic idea of the RD design, and suggests that the effect of the UAG on GSE purchase activity is small (in percentage terms). Figure 3 is analogous to Figure 2 , except that the Y-axis variable in this case is (log) GSE-purchases of originations that are eligible for GSE purchase per (1990) owner-occupied unit. The gap between the two lines implies an effect at the cutoff of less than 5%. MSA fixed effects so that the discontinuity is identified only from variation across the cutoff within MSAs. I also control for two tract scale variables -(log) number of owner-occupied units and (log) total housing units, both measured in 1990. Columns 1-7 show estimates using a bandwidth of five percentage points, while columns 8-11 show estimates using a bandwidth of two percentage points.
Effects on Secondary Market Purchasing Activity
The point estimate in column 1 basically provides the difference in mean GSE purchase activity across the cutoff after adjusting for tract size and MSA, and shows the GSEs purchase about 10% fewer loans in tracts with TM between 85 and 90 relative to those between 90 and 95.
Even after adjusting for the remainder of the covariates listed in Table 2 , the GSEs purchase about 3% fewer loans (column 2).
Column 3 institutes the local linear approach described earlier, controlling only for MSA and tract size. The coefficient on TM is significant and the discontinuity estimate now is positive (1.5%) though not statistically different from zero. The results of the first three columns illustrate the difficulties of a strategy that tries to identify the GSE effect simply by controlling for observables.
In column 4 I add in the set of covariates used in column 2. Under the assumptions (1.3) and that the linear TM terms correctly control for the trend in GSE purchases on either side of the cutoff, covariates are not needed in theory to identify the discontinuity and including covariates might be viewed as deviating from the spirit of the quasi-experimental RD design. But including covariates can improve precision and help correct small sample bias in the basic specification (Imbens and Lemieux 2007) . Of course, if the inclusion of covariates results in "large" differences in the point estimates, one might be concerned that the identification assumption (1.3) does not hold. But Figure 2 suggests this should not be the case. The standard error in column 4 does fall and the point estimate rises only slightly in absolute terms -about 0.007 -again suggesting that observables change quite smoothly across the cutoff.
In column 5 I include the (log) number of GSE-purchases between 1994 and 1996 as a regressor that will control for unobservable tract characteristics and likely improve the precision of the estimates further. I consider 1994-1996 a pre-treatment period as these years come before the goal level increases in 1997 and 2001. Nevertheless, if the GSEs responded to knowledge of the future goals during these early years, then including this lagged value will net out this earlier impact.
The estimate (standard error) in column 5 is about 0.031 (0.017). While marginally significant, I view this result with some caution as the point estimate has now roughly doubled relative to the baseline specification in column 3. Still, the absolute value of the difference between the point estimates in columns 3 and 5 is small (about 0.015).
Columns 6 and 7 use triangular kernel weights. These estimates are slightly larger than those using rectangular weights. And again, including the lagged value reduces the standard error considerably. These estimates suggest a discontinuity in GSE-purchase volume of just under 4%.
Columns 8-11 show nonparametric estimates (in the sense that they do not include parametric controls for TM) and the bandwidth (h) has been cut to 0.02. Columns 8 and 9 use rectangular weights while 10 and 11 use triangular weights. The column 8 specification is analogous to that in column 2. These estimates are similar in magnitude to those discussed earlier and the specifications that include the lag (columns 9 and 11) are statistically significant.
14 Overall, Table 2 provides evidence of a 3-4% effect of the UAG on GSE purchase activity at the cutoff, although this is conditional on including tract covariates. Next, I look for evidence of whether increased GSE purchase activity in targeted tracts crowds out non-GSE purchases of GSE-eligible originations in targeted tracts. Table 4 provides estimates of the discontinuity in non-GSE purchase activity in targeted tracts. The eight specifications in Table 4 correspond to the specifications in columns 4-11 in Table 3 . Table 4 provides no evidence of crowd out. On the contrary some of the point estimates, in particular those specifications controlling for a lag of the outcome variable, are similar in magnitude to those in Table 3 although only one of the estimates is statistically significant. One reason that non-GSE purchases might increase in targeted tracts is that GSEeligible mortgages in these areas now represent more liquid assets because of the UAG and so may be more attractive to non-GSE secondary market participants.
14 It is worth noting that the point estimates in columns 9 and 11 rise slightly with the inclusion a linear control function.
Reporting error by HMDA respondents is another reason non-GSE purchases might appear to increase. In particular, the purchaser variable in HMDA may be reported with considerable error (Scheeseele 1998). If lenders do not accurately report to whom they sell their loans, and if the UAG does in fact lead to an increase in credit flow, this combination could result in an observed increase in non-GSE purchases that simply reflects the underlying expansion in GSE-eligible credit flow.
Effect on Overall Credit Flow
The ultimate objective of the GSE Act is to increase credit flow to targeted groups.
Instead of looking at direct purchases by the GSEs, I now look at the effect of the UAG on all GSE-eligible originations from 1997-2002 (3 rd row of Table 2 ). To be more concise, I show only the specifications corresponding to those in columns 5, 6 and 8 in Table 4 . Other specifications shown earlier generate similar results for the outcome variables in the tables to follow. The estimates in Table 5 follow a pattern similar to those in Tables 3 and 4 . In particular, including the lag as an independent variable yields a slightly higher and statistically significant estimate of about 2.7% that is robust to using a triangular kernel (column 3).
One useful exercise is to show discontinuity estimates at points other than TM = 0.90. If the same specification(s) yields significant discontinuities elsewhere, that would indicate that the discontinuity found at TM = 0.90 may be spurious. Figure 4 shows estimated discontinuities in (log) GSE-eligible originations using the specification in column 2 from for a discontinuity at so many values, it should not be surprising in a statistical sense to find at least one significant jump. Overall, Figure 4 suggests the empirical relationship between loan volume and TM is smooth and that the discontinuity at 0.90 is not likely to be spurious. 
Testing for Crowd-out of Subprime and FHA Loans
As hypothesized in two papers by An and Bostic (2006, 2008) , if prime lenders are more aggressive in pursuing applicants in targeted areas they may attract the highest quality FHA and subprime applicants. Along these lines, other research suggests that many borrowers that obtain high cost FHA or subprime loans likely could have qualified for a prime loan (e.g. Pennington- In Table 7 I test for crowd-out by estimating the discontinuity in GSE-ineligible lending, which consists primarily of FHA loans and loans by subprime lenders (as determined by HUD).
Also included in this set of loans are VA loans and loans that are above the conforming loan amount limit ('jumbo' loans). Table 7 provides no evidence of crowd-out as argued by An and
Bostic. In fact, all of the point estimates are positive, but relatively small (about 1%) and statistically insignificant. 
The Underserved Areas Goal and GSE Activity in 2005 and 2006
In addition to cross-sectional variation in treatment status, TM also varies over time. Intuitively, this strategy aims to compare the change in lending in tracts that just switched treatment status to those that almost switched. In other words, (4.2) merges a difference-indifference (DD) identification strategy with an RD strategy. with the exception of minority population share, although switching tracts minority share grew more sharply. Cleary, these two groups are not comparable in terms of their pre-treatment trends, invalidating a simple DD strategy. The RD strategy just discussed, however, will attempt to control for these divergent trends and isolate the effect of switching into the treatment group. One reason may be that an increasing number of "eligible" loans are in fact not conforming, consistent with an increasing subprime share of the mortgage market during this period.
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The first column of Table 9 Of course, these estimates represent the average effect for all tracts falling just below the cutoff relative to those falling just above it. If the GSEs hesitate to lend in targeted tracts that have deteriorated considerably, there will be heterogeneity in the UAG's effect on credit supply.
In other words, if the GSEs weigh safety and soundness considerations against their social commitments, then the effect of falling below the UAG threshold will be a function of how far the tract has fallen. The estimates in column 1 imply that the UAG has a 6% effect on GSE purchases for tracts that fell just below the threshold in 2004 from just above, and that this effect trails off by 0.5% per unit increase in TM old , consistent with the notion that the GSEs do react to the UAG, but weigh safety and soundness considerations against these social obligations.
Columns 2 and 3 show results for GSE-eligible and ineligible originations, respectively.
Although the relatively large standard errors limit confidence in the point estimates, their magnitudes -2.7% for eligible originations compared to 0.4% for ineligible originations -are consistent with increased GSE purchases due to the UAG having a positive effect on overall eligible credit supply and no effect on FHA and subprime lending.
Conclusions
In this paper, I identify the impact of the Underserved Areas Goal (UAG) established under the GSE Act by taking advantage of a discontinuity in the census tract eligibility rule.
I find that this goal has a direct effect on GSE purchasing activity of 3-4% and increases overall GSE-eligible originations by 2-3% between 1997 and 2002. Unlike previous research, I
find no evidence of an offsetting reduction in FHA and subprime loans. I do not find discontinuities at points away from the cutoff (Figure 4) , buttressing the causal interpretation of these results. However, the results do rely on including covariates to make the results precise and thus lack the interpretive confidence associated with a "true" RD design.
One important limitation of the regression discontinuity strategy is that it only identifies the goal's impact at the eligibility cutoff. The results in this paper say little about the UAG's effect on census tracts away from the cutoff. Of course, this limitation is countered by the RD design's ability to overcome a challenging identification problem as well as the ability to identify general equilibrium effects (e.g. crowd-out) within this framework.
The 2.7% estimated effect on GSE-eligible lending (Table 5) Overall, the results of this research provide little support for the notion that the affordable housing goals pushed heavily on the GSEs to overexpose themselves to risky mortgages and that adherence to the goals fueled the current subprime crisis. Similarly, Bhutta (2008a and 2008b) argues that the "Special Affordable Goal" (bottom panel of Figure 1 ) has not distorted credit supply measurably. Nevertheless, the research on the effect of the affordable housing goals remains incomplete without detailed analyses of all the goals. It is also important to keep in mind the inability of the RD design to provide credible information about the goals' effect on GSE behavior away from the cutoff. Notes: The "Underserved Areas" goal targets GSE purchases in low-income & minority neighborhoods: tracts with median family income less than or equal to 90% of the MSA median family income, or tracts with a minority population share of at least 30% and a median family income no greater than 120% of the MSA median family income. The "Low and Moderate Income" goal specifies a target share of purchases to borrowers with income below the MSA median family income. The "Special Affordable" goal targets borrowers with income below 60% of the MSA median family income and borrowers with income below 80% of the MSA median family income in a census tract that has a median family income less than or equal to 80% of the MSA median family income. Table 1 ) estimated from a tract-level regression of (log) number of refinance and home purchase originations on tract characteristics and MSA fixed-effects (estimated fixed-effects not used to generate predicted values). Each data point represents the mean of Y-axis variable within one percentage point bins of the X-axis variable. Also shown are local linear regression generated fits of the underlying predicted values, created seperately on either side of the cutoff. Table 1 for list) and two tract-level scale variables measured in 1990: (log) owner-occupied units and (log) total housing units. Dependent variable is the (log) number o GSE-eligible refinance and home purchase mortgages purchased by Non-GSE's between 1997 and 2002 at the census tract level. (log) refinance and home purchase mortgages originated in each of the three periods specified above at the census tract level. 
